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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 15-2942
_____________
DAVID JANKOWSKI,
Appellant
v.
ROBERT LELLOCK;
LYNN MEYERS-JEFFREY;
RONALD ZANGARO
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-13-cv-00194
District Judge: The Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 19, 2016
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: May 20, 2016)
_____________________
OPINION
_____________________



This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff David Jankowski alleges that Defendant Robert Lellock, a former
Arthur J. Rooney Middle School Police Officer, sexually abused Jankowski on
multiple occasions. The question in this appeal, however, is whether Jankowski
has alleged facts sufficient to make out a claim for relief against Defendants Lynn
Meyers-Jeffrey and Ronald Zangaro, the detention aide and the school principal,
respectively, at Rooney Middle School. Jankowski alleges that both individuals
knew or should have known that Lellock was pulling students out of class for oneon-one meetings. He then concludes that both individuals knew or should have
known Lellock was abusing these students. Jankowski, however, has failed to
plead any facts supporting this inference. He has thus failed to make out a viable
cause of action against either Meyers-Jeffrey or Zangaro, despite having had three
opportunities to do so. We therefore hold that the District Court did not err in
dismissing the claims against both Meyers-Jeffrey and Zangaro and will affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
I.
Starting in the fall of 1998 and lasting until May 1999,1 Lellock, at the time
a School Police Officer employed by the Pittsburgh Public Schools, allegedly
abused up to twenty-two male students at Rooney Middle School. Jankowski was
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one of Lellock’s victims. Jankowski alleges that on multiple occasions during the
1998-1999 school year, Lellock removed him from Meyers-Jeffrey’s study
hall/detention classroom, took him to a supply closet, and sexually violated him.
While criminal charges against Lellock also resulted, Jankowski brought this
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jankowski claims that Lellock violated his right
to bodily integrity, which is secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and enforced through § 1983. Jankowski’s original complaint named
as defendants the Pittsburgh Public Schools and eighteen individuals (including
Lellock, Meyers-Jeffrey, and Zangaro) who were connected in various ways with
Rooney Middle School. However, after his first two complaints were dismissed in
part for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Jankowski amended his complaint to sue only three individuals: Lellock, MeyersJeffrey, and Zangaro.
Meyers-Jeffrey was a detention aide at Rooney Middle School for the 19981999 school year and it was from her classroom that Jankowski alleges he was
pulled by Lellock on multiple occasions over the course of the school year.
Jankowski also alleges that Lellock pulled up to twenty-one other boys from
Meyers-Jeffrey’s classroom over the course of the year, explaining to her that he
needed to speak to the student or that the student was “in trouble again.” This was,
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The second amended complaint does not give specific dates or date ranges.
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according to Jankowski, a violation of district policy.
Zangaro was the principal of Rooney Middle School, and Jankowski alleges
that he knew that Lellock was removing students from class for one-on-one
meetings, yet failed to do anything to stop it. In addition to alleging supervisory
liability, Jankowski alleges that Zangaro failed to properly train his staff on the
district’s policy prohibiting anyone from pulling students from classrooms.
After considering Jankowski’s second amended complaint, however, the
District Court again dismissed the claims against everyone except Lellock,
explaining that Jankowski had not carried his burden of pleading facts sufficient to
suggest liability on the part of anyone besides Lellock. While this dismissal was
initially an interlocutory order because the claims against Lellock were still
pending, the District Court later granted Jankowski’s Rule 54(b) motion to convert
the order into a final decision, thus permitting immediate appeal. Accordingly, on
August 12, 2015, Jankowski appealed the District Court’s order holding that his
second amended complaint failed to plead a cause of action against Meyers-Jeffrey
and Zangaro.
II.
“We review a district court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss under a
plenary standard.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a
4

complaint, which may be dismissed for the “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to
dismiss, we take a three-step approach:
First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted)). Regarding factual allegations, as the Supreme
Court made clear in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, such allegations “must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). We have further held that when performing this analysis, we “accept the
factual allegations contained in the Complaint as true, but we disregard rote recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory
statements.” James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 55557; Burtch, 662 F.3d at 220-21).
Thus, in order for Jankowski’s complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it
must allege facts that, if true, suggest a plausible entitlement to relief against
Meyers-Jeffrey and Zangaro. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial
5

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
The District Court assumed for the purpose of deciding the motion to
dismiss that Jankowski made out a claim against Lellock for violation of his right
to bodily integrity. That said, it is clearly established that government officials are
liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct, and cannot “be held liable for
the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat
superior.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 676). We must, therefore, look at each defendant’s own actions as alleged
in the complaint.
In this regard, Jankowski does not claim that either Meyers-Jeffrey or
Zangaro actively encouraged or participated in the illegal conduct of Lellock;
instead he attempts to show that both Meyers-Jeffrey and Zangaro knew or should
have known about Lellock’s actions and did nothing.

Section 1983 liability

attaches only if there is either a supervisor-subordinate relationship or a state law
duty to control the actions of the primary actor. C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226
F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2000) (“It is, of course, well established that a defendant in
a civil rights case cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he
or she neither participated in nor approved.”); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120
F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. &
6

Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (“[E]xcept perhaps in unusual
circumstances, a government official or employee who lacks supervisory authority
over the person who commits a constitutional tort cannot be held, based on mere
inaction, to have ‘acquiesced’ in the unconstitutional conduct.”).
Once this supervisory relationship is established, we have articulated two
ways in which a supervisor may be liable for unconstitutional actions undertaken
by a subordinate. First, liability may attach if the supervisor, “‘with deliberate
indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or
custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.’” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v.
Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in
original) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d
Cir. 1989)). This standard encompasses Jankowski’s failure to train claim, and
specifically requires (1) deliberate indifference and (2) direct causation. Black by
Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 712-13 (3d Cir. 1993).
Second, at least prior to Iqbal, “a supervisor may be personally liable under
§ 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to
violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced” in the
subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 586

(citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)). Or, put
another way,
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[A] plaintiff asserting a failure to supervise claim must not only
identify a specific supervisory practice that the defendant failed to
employ, he or she must also allege both (1) contemporaneous
knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern
of similar incidents, and (2) circumstances under which the
supervisor’s inaction could be found to have communicated a message
of approval.
Oliva, 226 F.3d at 202 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[W]e
have refrained from answering the question of whether Iqbal eliminated—or at
least narrowed the scope of—supervisory liability because it was ultimately
unnecessary to do so in order to dispose of the appeal then before us.” Argueta v.
U.S. Imm. and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70 (3d Cir. 2011). As in
Argueta, we “make the same choice here because we determine that [Jankowski]
failed to allege a plausible claim to relief on the basis of the supervisors’
‘knowledge and acquiescence’ or any other similar theory of liability.” Id.
III.
Applying this legal framework to the facts in Jankowski’s second amended
complaint convinces us that the District Court correctly dismissed the claims
against both Meyers-Jeffrey and Zangaro. First, Jankowski never alleges that
either Meyers-Jeffrey, who was merely an aide in the detention classroom, or
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Zangaro had any supervisory or actual authority2 over Lellock, thus immediately
casting serious doubt on both claims.

Second, Jankowski’s second amended

complaint, stripped of its conclusory allegations, pleads very few facts, none of
which transform his claims into anything more than pure speculation. This is so
because Jankowski relies primarily on the strength of an inference that we believe
is unreasonable. He argues that because Lellock (1) pulled approximately twentytwo male students out of detention over the course of the school year to talk to
them individually and (2) did so in apparent violation of a district policy forbidding
the removal of students from a classroom, it was “obvious” that Lellock was
intending to have “private one-on-one encounters with those male students.” Thus,
he concludes that Meyers-Jeffrey and Zangaro knew or should have known that
Lellock was sexually abusing these students.
We cannot agree with Jankowski that this final inference is reasonable in
light of the facts alleged. Assuming that either or both individuals did have actual
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While, presumably, a school principal has some authority over the school’s police
officer, Jankowski’s second amended complaint never alleges that Zangaro had
either supervisory or actual authority over Lellock. Indeed, the only reference to
Lellock’s employment status is that he was an employee of the Pittsburgh Public
Schools, perhaps casting doubt on Zangaro’s authority to control the actions of
Lellock if we infer that he was also supervised at the district level. See generally
Mercedes J. Howze, Pittsburgh Public Schools names new Chief of School Safety,
New
Pittsburgh
Courier
(June
5,
2015),
http://newpittsburghcourieronline.com/2015/06/05/pittsburgh-public-schoolsnames-new-police-chief/.
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authority over Lellock, supervisory liability still requires a plaintiff to show that
the supervisor knew about and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional
conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 586. Jankowski has not met this
standard for either Meyers-Jeffrey or Zangaro. Mere knowledge that students are
being pulled from class to speak with a school police officer in violation of a
district policy does not lead one to reasonably conclude that those students are then
being sexually assaulted by that officer.

The facts alleged, therefore, do not

support the claim that either Meyers-Jeffrey or Zangaro actually knew about
Lellock’s conduct during the 1998-1999 school year. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”). Thus, we hold that both claims of supervisory liability were
properly dismissed by the District Court.
Turning to Jankowski’s failure to train claim, we conclude that this
allegation fares no better. The entire claim is relegated to a single sentence in the
complaint, which simply states that Zangaro “failed to properly train the teachers at
the Arthur J. Rooney Middle School during the school year 1998 and 1999 school
year [sic] . . . regarding the School District policy that forbade school police from
removing children from classrooms for private, unsupervised encounters.” This is
merely a rote recitation of a cause of action coupled with a legal conclusion. City
of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d at 679 (“[W]e disregard rote recitals of the elements of a
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cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory statements.”). It does not
contain any facts on which we can or should rely. We therefore conclude that this
claim was also properly dismissed by the District Court.3
IV.
For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the District Court’s
judgment in favor of Meyers-Jeffrey and Zangaro.

3

Indeed, even if Jankowski had shown a failure to train, he presents no facts
suggesting such a failure would have been anything more than mere negligence;
far short of the high “deliberate indifference” standard he also had to satisfy. See
Black by Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 1993).
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